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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND
FARM POVERTY ON THE
NORTH AMERICAN PLAINS,
1933~1940

HARRY C. McDEAN

ORIGINS OF THE Two POLICIES

Chronic farm poverty in the Great Plains during the Great Depression of the 1930s provoked
sharply differing responses from the governments of the United States and Canada. Among
the many features of American and Canadian
life that helped shape those different responses,
the most significant was the status of the social
sciences in agriculture. In nearly every category
one might employ to assess their comparative
status, from funding to publication record to
political influence, social scientists in the
United States enjoyed an impressive advantage
over those in Canada by 1930 .. A historical
appraisal of one element in this disparity-the
research and the political influence of social
scientists who worked in the field of chronic
farm poverty-will help explain, at least in part,
why the two countries pursued different strategies toward chronic farm poverty in the Great
Plains.

To a great extent, the policies of the United
States in the thirties flowed. from federal
bureaus staffed by politically influential social
scientists who had done extensive research
during the preceding decade in the Great Plains
and in other agricultural regions where there
was a high incidence of impoverished farmers.
In Canada, on the other hand, the social scientists in agriculture were not nearly as influential, and when they did wield some political
clout, their recommendations stemmed from
research conducted during the depression itself
and not from research during the far more
prosperous period of the 1920s, as was the case
with the American social scientists.
In other words, those Canadian social scientists who could influence policies studied a
. different group of impoverished Great Plains
farmers. When the Americans probed the
sources of chronic farm poverty during the
boom times of the 1920s, they were dealing
with a population that appeared incapable of
adjustment to an economy undergoing the
normal stresses that were assumed to be part
of the processes of agricultural and industrial
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modernization. On the other hand, the Canadians, carrying out their research during the
Great Depression, viewed all impoverished
farmers as victims of the depression and the
drought and therefore could not identify those
farmers who were incapable of adjusting to a
modernizing economy, if indeed they even
thought of that possibility.
The impoverished group of Canadian Great
Plains farmers presented their social scientists
with some special probl~ms. For example, the
Canadian group contained many more recent
migrants with rural European backgrounds. 1
This fIrst-generation immigrant group may have
misled the Canadian social scientists, who concluded that they were not "Canadian" and were
accustomed to a different, peasant style of life
-even preferred it. Thus, the argument ran,
they should be allowed to follow their preferences until they or their progeny expressed a
desire to assimilate and become "Canadian.,,2
The American social scientists, by contrast,
faced in America's southern plains an impoverished group, the "Okies," 98 percent of
whom were white, Anglo-saxon, Protestant, and
native-born. American social scientists could
not therefore dub them foreigners whose background bred a preference for a lower-class lifestyle. Instead, they had to deal squarely with
features of their lives that resulted in chronic
impoverishment. 3
Even though the "Okies" and the European
immigrants in Canada suggested different research avenues, the approach of the social
scientists was affected to a much greater extent
by the general conditions of the times in which
they conducted their research. The twenties
were a period of incredible largess for the
American agricultural social scientists who had
pioneered the fIeld in the years before World
War I. Suddenly they found themselves in
charge of heavily funded private research institutions and directing major federal and state
bureaus for agricultural research. Of the private
groups, probably the most signifIcant was the
American Farm Economics Association. Of
the public bureaus, the most important was the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) in

the United States Department of Agriculture.
During the twenties, it was common for the
leadership in the former to be identical with
the directors of the latter.
U. S. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

During the early twenties the most influential founder of the Farm Economics Association, Dr. Henry C. Taylor of the University
of Wisconsin, was also the chief of the BAE.
Taylor and these agencies deeply influenced
the course of social science research on impoverished farmers in the American Great Plains.
Taylor's farm background, his university
training, and his professional research instilled
in him a strong bias against those who were
chronic failures at farming. He believed these
people represented the "degenerative" element
in the American amalgam-a group whose
inferiorities retarded the march of the modern
reforms that he and other social scientists envisioned for rural America. Indeed, Taylor and
many of his colleagues feared that without the
careful planning they intended to provide for
the modern American farmer, the American
countryside might turn into a "dumping
ground" for degenerative Americans. 4
Taylor's bias might not have been important
were it not that his publications, carrying this
message, were widely read by social scientists
who did research in the Great Plains. Then too,
Taylor's writings dominated university classrooms, and he personally trained many graduate students who researched the plains in the
twenties and became architects of New Deal
agricultural policies in the thirtie~.S They inClude M. L. Wilson, who headed various federal
and state research teams in the plains during
the twenties and went on to become Secretary
Henry A. Wallace's chief architect of USDA
policy in the Great Plains during the 1930s;
Lewis C. Gray, perhaps the most notable of the
nation's land economists in the twenties and a
major consultant to every New Deal agency
operating in the plains during the thirties; John
D. Black and Howard R. Tolley, whose research
in the twenties directly influenced all phases
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of New Deal planning in the plains during the
thirties; Oliver E. Baker, O. C. Stine, Charles
Galpin, and other social scientists whose research bore heavily on Great Plains policy
during the thirties.
While there can be little doubt that the prevailing climate of racism and xenophobia in
America during the twenties affected the
views of these social scientists, Taylor himself
was a strong influence during the formative
period of their careers. 6 Indeed, each was employed by Taylor during the twenties when he
headed the BAE. It was during this period that
the BAE initiated the nation's first in-depth
examination of chronic rural farm poverty
carried out by teams of professionally trained
social scientists.
In 1924 the BAE formally launched this
research under the direction of M. L. Wilson.
Chairman of the Department of Agricultural
Economics at Montana State College in Bozeman, Wilson was brought into the BAE to head
its Division of Farm Management. Taylor handpicked Wilson partly because he had been one
of his top graduate students but also because
Wilson had directed social science research
teams that had investigated the causes of farm
success and failure on Montana's plains. wilson's research in the northern plains confirmed
Taylor's views.
In essence, Wilson's work provided a set of
character promes of farmers who settled in the
plains of Montana. These promes were exhaustive in volume and detail, and can only be summarized here. According to Wilson, there were
many "shotgun farmers" who rushed onto
Montana's plains in the prewar years. Comprising perhaps one-half of the settlers, most
abandoned their farms with the drought that
came during the war or when grain prices fell
sharply after 1920. The majority were townspeople in the grasp of a speculative mood that
led them to believe they could make fast
money farming the northern plains. Ignorant
of modern dry-farming techniques, they quickly abandoned their properties when their soils
became less productive. Left behind were
thousands of farmers of considerable experience

FIG. 1. M. L. Wilson in a stand of Montana
wheat, 1915. M. L. Wilson Collection, Montana State University Archives, Bozeman, Mont.

who now had to contend with such problems
as soil blowing and thistle infestations caused
by the "shotgun farmers." Wilson found that
some experienced farmers contended with these
problems better than others, and he made an
effort to distinguish these farmers from one
another by developing a system to measure
their level of success. Employing graphics to
distinguish these levels-pictures of the homes,
modern conveniences, machinery, buildings,
farm journals, and the like-Wilson attempted
to delineate distinctive classes of farmers. 7
Wilson's own upbringing no doubt persuaded
him to employ material possessions as signs of
farming success. Born and raised on a middleclass farm in Iowa, he was convinced that
success in farming brought with it many of the
material benefits and conveniences that might
be found in the home of a similarly successful
town resident. The large home he grew up in
contained accouterments indicative of his
family's alertness to innovation and change, for
his parents subscribed to many farm journals
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FIG. 2. Huge wheat harvesting machinery in use in Montana in 1938. Such technological
developments demonstrated that a decreasing number of farmers were needed on the Great
Plains. M. L. Wilson Collection, Montana State University Archives, Bozeman, Mont.

and magazines that reported new techniques in
farm practice and recent developments in agricultural science and technology. 8
Wilson's research identified only a small
percentage of plains farmers in Montana whose
residences matched the standards of success he
envisioned. In a huge area-of Montana, nearly
three-quarters fell below the middle-class standard that Wilson employed. Yet some of the
farmers in this group showed signs that they
were alert to innovation and to change in agriculture: they subscribed to modern farm
journals; they· knew of recent developments in
farm management, technology, and science; and
many attended Montana State College's extension courses. Clearly, they could be called
"progressive farmers," even though they fell
below middle-class standards. 9
Wilson concluded that these progressive
farmers would be unable to take advantage of
their abilities until substantial reforms were
enacted in the plains economy. Included among
these needed changes was the exit from Montana's agriculture of those poor farmers who did
not exhibit the alertness required for successful
farming in the plains. The most obviously
necessary reforms were the consolidation of
small farm units and the mechanization of

operations on these lar~er units. Wilson argued
that careful research by farm management experts was needed to determine the sizes of
farms requisite for successful farming in each
area, but it was clear that until farm expansion,
consolidation, and mechanization were carried
forward, only a small percentage of Montana's
farmers could expect to rise to a level of living
envisioned by Wilson as "standard.,,10
These conclusions recommended Wilson to
Taylor because, by 1924, Taylor was concerned
that even the alert, progressive farmer might
vanish from the countryside without considerable reforms. Taylor asked Wilson to head a
nationwide study of "pathological farming
areas" -an ostensibly clinical tepm adopted
by Taylor's social scientists for its evocation
of concepts of disease and abnormality.l1
The studies that Wilson's division began in
1924 were carried out in cooperation with
social scientists employed by the experiment
stations, extension services, and agricultural
colleges. Taylor and Wilson identified regions in
the Southwest, the Red River Valley, and the
Great Plains that they labeled "pathological
farming areas." Then they reached cooperative
research agreements with state agricultural
research institutions in these regions. The
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BAE agreed to fund social scientists whose research projects would (1) provide a profile of
the progressive farmer in their area; (2) examine
the economic status of the progressive farmer,
taking pains to compare his material possessions
with those of progressive farmers who resided
outside of the "pathological farming area";
(3) provide a proHle of the unprogressive farmer in the pathological area, paying particular
attention to his current farm practices and,
especially, to his awareness of and receptivity
to modern information systems in farm management and agricultural technology. 12
This research program of the BAE heavily
influenced the formation of American farm
policy during the New Deal period. Its greatest
impact was on New Deal policy in the Great
Plains. In this region, most of the bulletins,
circulars, pamphlets, journal articles, and
books that resulted from the research project
could be distilled into a simple message: a
heavy out-migration of the poor, unprogressive
farmers was the foundation upon which to
build any sensible federal policy for agriculture
on the plains. 13
The need for this out-migration was simple
enough to understand. Researchers showed
that regardless of a farmer's individual abilities,
if he worked a farm that was "submarginal"
in the pathological farming area, he was bound
to live in poverty. The definition of a "submarginal farm" varied greatly even within small
areas of the plains. But the social scientists
utilized a set of related conditions, such as
climate, soil type, fertility, farm size, comparative capitalization costs, and the farm's suitability for raising commodities that could be
produced at costs competitive with those grown
in other regions, in order to determine for each
particular area what could be an above-marginal
operation. Such a composite picture of supermarginal farming operations provided the basis
for the reform policies that these social scientists advocated in the Great Plains.
Their research also indicated that there were
farmers with a progressive profile who nonetheless lived on submarginal farms. These poor
farmers were attentive to information systems

of the social scientists, but they could not fully
exploit that information to uplift themselves
because large numbers of submarginal, unprogressive farmers checked their advance. In Oklahoma, for example, the researchers found that
unprogressive farmers moved about annually
from one submarginal farm to another. This
horizontal class movement tended to perpetuate the submarginal farming system in the
plains regions of that state. It prevented the
progressive farmers from enlarging their own
operations and also exhausted the soil. Should
this trend continue, it would overwhelm any
efforts to establish above-marginal operations
in these pathological farming areas. 14
Indeed, subsequent research revealed that
many of the difficulties in the southern plains
stemmed from the problem of itinerant workers
who used their submarginal farms as way stations in their endless search for nonagricultural
work. 15 Although this trend was not apparent
to the researchers in the twenties, they did
pinpoint the detrimental role played by the
unprogressive farmer in the pathological farming regions of the Great Plains.
NEW DEAL PLAINS POLICY

This research and the conclusions it suggested bore heavily on the thoughts of the
social scientists who found themselves in a
position to shape federal farm policy in the
Great Plains during the New Deal period,
from 1933 to 1940. Social scientists who had
led research teams in the Great Plains during
the twenties, such as M. L. Wilson, Howard R.
Tolley, and Lewis C. Gray, were thrust into
national prominence during the New Deal
period and were entrusted with formulating
USDA policy in the plains. They responded by
creating the Northern and Southern Great Plains
councils. They charged the two plains councils
with the task of sponsoring programs that
aimed to define "areas which should remain in
cultivation but where changes in cultural treatment and farming systems should be put into
effect; areas where increases in the size of farms
are needed; areas that should be used primarily
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for grazing with some farming in combination;
areas which should be used only for grazing,
forests, wildlife, recreation, or a combination
of these." Once this was accomplished, the
committees should establish "cultural practices
and systems of farming which should be followed ... in each problem area which is to be
retained in cultivation, and to analyze existing
and possible new state legislation with respect
to conservancy districts, rural zoning, cooperative grazing associations, assessment of taxation
practices, state aids to local taxing jurisdictions ... in order to determine their relation to
the achievement of the results desired from a
unified program." Finally, the New Dealers
asked the committees to structure their programs politically so they would bring all state
and federal agricultural programs under one
bureaucratic umbrella. 16
These instructions were designed to achieve
the specific goals that the planners had had in
mind for nearly a decade. Such a plan, they
believed, would remove soil-exhausted areas of
the plains from cultivation, to be revitalized by
soil-building grasses. Lands that were fertile
would be zoned for the production of agricultural commodities that would be soil-conserving
and suited to the region's farm economy. Small
farms would be phased out by government
programs that would encourage their sale to
farmers and to cattlemen who needed additional acreage to make operations profitable
and soil-conserving.
The achievement of this goal would profoundly alter the farm economy in some areas
in the plains, while others that already had
initiated suitable reforms would be affected
less directly by the program. In the high plains
of eastern Colorado, for example, more than
half of the fertile farms would have to increase
in size to at least 1,180 acres; while in southwestern Nebraska, where most farms already
averaged 400 acres, few would need enlargement to be profitable. To encourage the creation of larger farms and to remove eroded soils
from cultivation, the government would need
to purchase an estimated 31 million acres of
fa~m land in the plains, mostly in the southern

region. Of this acreage, 24 million acres would
be retired permanently from cultivation; the
remainder would be sold to farmers needing to
expand operations. 17
This program of land retirement and farm
adjustment would displace an estimated fifty
thousand farm families still resident in the
plains, who would require relocation and, preferably, different occupations. The number
who would be displaced varied by region,
depending on the agricultural adjustments that
already had been made. In some sections of
North Dakota, where a large number of farms
would have to be increased to an average size
of 800 acres, about one-fifth of the farm population would need to find different work. By
contrast, where suitably sized farms generally
had been established, as in the plains of northeastern Montana and southwestern Nebraska,
as little as 7 percent of the farm population
would be affected. 18
THE U.S. RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

The Department of Agriculture's social
scientists devised several plans to resettle the
chronically poor plains farmers. They were convinced that these farmers were by definition
unprogressive, lacking the managerial talents
necessary for success in modern farming. Thus,
the central objective in each scheme was to
divert them into occupational situations that
did not require such talents.
Although the social scientists recognized
that this objective was critical to their plans,
they encountered severe problems that prevented them from achieving it. They contrived
several schemes that sought to shift chronically poor farmers into situations that might
permit them to earn decent incomes as wage
workers. The first was the Subsistence Homesteads Program, which operated from 1933 to
1934. The second was the Resettlement Administration, which functioned from 1935 until
it was absorbed by yet a third program, the
Farm Security Administration, which served
through the early years of World War II.
The Subsistence Homesteads Program was
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FIG. 3. A typical homestead house built by the USDA Division of Subsistence Homesteads,
headed by M. L. Wilson. From the private collection of Harry C. McDean.

the product of social scientists such as M. L.
Wilson, Howard Tolley, and L. C. Gray. Concerned that a heavy migration from the Great
Plains would deplete the region of the population base it needed for the development of
modern community services, these men proposed a plan designed to transform dislodged
poor farmers into pools of readily available
workers for the factories that would be encouraged to move into the Great Plains. This would
be accomplished by moving the displaced farmers into new rural towns that the federal
government would build in strategic locations
in the Great Plains. The social scientists calculated that industries would move into these
new towns in order to take advantage of the
lower overhead operating costs that such rural
settings afforded them. 19
In the fall of 1933, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads, headed by M. L. Wilson,
began to select sites for these new federal communities. Because his division had an initial
appropriation from the Congress of only $25
million, Wilson was convinced that the first
communities would have to be few in number

and therefore could act only' as models for
future developments in the plains. By early
1934, Wilson had selected fourteen rural community sites in the Great Plains, and the construction of facilities and the selection of
settlers were under way by midyear.20 Wilson
soon found, however, that his appeal for industries to decentralize into these locales fell on
deaf ears. Although Ford Motor Company,
B. F. Goodrich, and Studebaker each had expressed an interest in decentralization to Wilson during the twenties, they demonstrated
no interest during depressed economic times. 21
The result was that when completion of the
construction and settlement of the communities was reached in 1934 and 1935, not one
industry had agreed to relocate. Wilson's entire
division thus came under heavy attack and he
was forced to resign. His division was abolished
and the newly created Resettlement Administration pursued a different plan.
This new administration was headed by Rexford Tugwell, a nationally recognized economist
from Columbia University. Tugwell shared the
views of Wilson and other plains social scientists
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on the character defects of chronically poor
farmers. He, too, believed that they must be
resettled with the opportunity to become factory workers, but he doubted that industries
were likely to decentralize into rural areas,
especially in the plains regions that were far
from established industrial and urban centers.
He therefore urged that the poor, dispossessed
plains farmers be moved great distances to
existing centers of trade and commerce where it
was realistic to expect that they might find
work. Such was the program of the Resettlement Administration. 22
Hoping to provide such displaced farmers
with federally constructed housing, Tugwell
began to develop several suburban communities. Once housed in these suburbs, the new
residents, Tugwell believed, could successfully
locate jobs in nearby urban factories.
Tugwell's plans were short-lived. In 1936
his administration was severely criticized for
lavish spending in the construction of the
suburbs. In fact, the costs of individual homes
in the new suburbs ran so high that some of
Tugwell's critics claimed that anyone who purchased them would need an executive's salary
in order to make the necessary payments. 23 In
any event, Tugwell was forced out of office
and his administration was replaced by the
Farm Security Administration in 1937.
The FSA never developed a permanent plan
to resettle the chronically poor plains farmers;
its plans were of a more temporary nature.
Recognizing that any long-term plans to help
displaced, chronically poor farmers were dependent upon industrial recovery in America,
the FSA intended to soften the impact of problems faced by the dispossessed plains farmers
until jobs became available for them in the industrial economy. Thus, the FSA organized
migratory labor camps to provide way stations
for the tens of thousands of "Okies" and
"Arkies" who migrated from the plains to both
urban and rural areas of the Far West. It also
founded "communal farms," where some of
these chronically poor displaced farmers could
be resettled as agricultural laborers under the
direction of skilled FSA farm management

supervisors.24 Even so, these plans were not
viewed as either fundamental or long-term.
The main energies of the social scientists were
directed toward achieving broad policies that
would inspire industrial recovery and open
great numbers of factory jobs to the emigrants
from areas of chronic farm poverty. 25
CANADIAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

While American social scientists worked
during the Great Depression to transform
chronically poor plains farmers into factory
workers, their Canadian counterparts planned
to keep all of their poor plains farmers in the
agricultural economy. Their research in plains
farm poverty during the Great Depression led
them to view all poor plains farmers as a group
that was impoverished by unusual conditions of
depression and of drought. They never sought
to identify in this group a class of unprogressive or chronically poor farmers.
This distinction grew out of the comparatively elementary status of the agricultural
social sciences in Canada. Whereas the social
sciences in American agriculture grew up during
the Progressive Era, in Canada their growth
followed world War 1. In the University of Saskatchewan, for example, the Department of
Farm Management was not organized until
1926, and farm economics as a field of agricultural specialization was not institutionalized
in that university until the 1930s. 26
At this early stage in the development of the
agricultural social sciences in the Canadian
plains, it was difficult for social scientists to
obtain funds for their research p;ojects. Thus,
. their research programs were minuscule when
compared with their counterparts in the United
States. Nearly the entire body of agricultural
social science research in Saskatchewan during
the twenties was in the field of production
costs. Yet not one of that province's research
projects had a range of inquiry broad enough to
explain how the comparative managerial
abilities of different farmers affected their
production costs and profits. 27 This narrow
focus may have come from the research interests
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of ·Professor William Allen, who pioneered production cost studies in the plains and was
chairman of the Department of Farm Management in the University of Saskatchewan. 28 But
Allen's special interests provide only a partial
explanation for the narrowness of social science
research in the Canadian plains.
During the twenties, Canada did not have a
dominion bureau of agricultural economics.
The institutionalization of this bureau in
Canada's dominion government followed that
in the United States by more than a decade,
and thus, in the twenties, there was no dominion bureau staffed by professional farm
economists with broad backgrounds that might
have widened the range of research projects.
Moreover, for want of such a bureau, no dominion funds were available to researchers who
might have wished to expand the range of social
science research in the plains.
Not until the Great Depression did funds
from outside the provinces flow into the Canadian plains to promote research in the agricultural social sciences. Even then, most of the
funding came not from Canadian sources but
from either American or international research
foundations. The most important research in
the Canadian plains during the depression was a
five-year project funded by the American Geographical Society and the Social Science Research Council. 29
Although the extensive publications from
such projects helped create long-term farm
adjustments in the Canadian plains, they were
too late to be of much use during the Great
Depression. Moreover, the social scientist
authors achieved- professional acclaim too
late for them to obtain positions of political
influence comparable with those enjoyed by
their counterparts in the United States during
the depression. Not until the end of the depression did Canadian social scientists such as W. A.
Mackintosh and G. E. Britnell win dominionwide acclaim for their penetrating research into
Canadian plains agriculture. 30 In Saskatchewan
the Royal Commission on Immigration and
Settlement had only one member who was a
social scientist; the other members included a

court reporter, a lawyer, an insurance agent,
and a farmer. 31
POLICY OF CANADIAN
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

When Canadian social scientists did help
formulate plains policy, their approach to
farm poverty differed substantially from that
of the Americans. This was because- the Canadians were dealing with the problems of a
large group of plains farmers who appeared to
be victims of drought and depression. The
major research programs in Canadian plains
agriculture in the thirties produced two classic
studies: G. E. Britnell's The Wheat Economy
and a multivolume study Charles Mackintosh
edited, Canadian Frontiers of Settlement.
These probed the causes of drought and of
depression in the Canadian plains and offered
judicious accounts of the economic and the
geographic forces that left destitute a large
percentage of the farmers of that region. 32 Unlike their American counterpart.s who had
.examined farm poverty in the plains during a
period of prosperity, Canada's social scientists
encountered conditions of drought and of
depression that led them away from classifying their farmers according to ability.
Since they did not try to arrange farmers
into classes, they never considered plans designed to relocate farmers who had become
chronically impoverished because they were
incapable of adopting management techniques
essential to success in a modern agricultural
economy.
Canadian social scientists therefore never
recommended programs designed to remove a
.substantial portion of impoverished farmers
permanently from agriculture. Yet in many
other respects, Canadian social scientists sought
agricultural reforms in the plains that were
similar to those proposed by American researchers. For example, the Canadian Prairies
Rehabilitation Act was designed to accomplish
the major conservation measures sought in the
USDA's directives to the American Northern
and Southern Great Plains councils. 33
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CANADIAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

The Canadian social scientists, unlike the
Americans, believed that poor farmers who left
the plains could be resettled as farmers elsewhere in Canada. Thus they never sought to
develop programs like the Subsistence Homesteads Program, the Resettlement Administration, and the Farm Security Administration,
all of which assumed that many contemporary
farmers were misfits in modern agriculture and
needed to be shifted into wage-earning occupations where they could be closely supervised.
Canadian policy in the plains included resettlement programs that evolved from the
belief that anyone with a background in farming had the potential to succeed in farming if
given a fair chance. Commonly called the
"Land Settlement Scheme," the Canadian plan
included a variety of provincial and dominion
loans and subsidies designed to help resettle
plains farm families in Canadian areas generally
north of the plains regions. These were newly
defined settlement districts such as Loon Lake,
Meadow Lake, Shand Creek, Carrot River
Valley, and Shellbrook-Meath Park. Unofficial
estimates reveal that by 1935 perhaps forty-five
thousand Canadians were resettled in such districts in northern Saskatchewan alone. 34
In these districts, the settlers faced new
problems that often overwhelmed them. Their
farm animals died of a variety of diseases; their
soil was too rocky and perennially wet; they
were unable to adapt scientific techniques
quickly enough to remain solvent; and even
when such conditions were not present, their
land holdings were far too small to produce a
decent income. Hence in 1935 Saskatchewan
established the Northern Settler's Re-establishment Branch to provide settlers with more
subsidies, with farm consultants, and often with
repeated resettI ement. 35
No doubt these Canadian resettlement programs succeeded in helping poor Canadian
plains farmers to relocate in regions where
pioneer agricultural skills could be employed.
Even so, such skills brought only poverty to
those who practiced them. Surveys made toward

the end of the thirties showed that most plains
farmers who were resettled lived at or below
levels they had experienced when they had
farmed in the plains. 36
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THESE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

The surveys suggest that Canadian policy
toward the chronically poor plains farmer was
less sagacious than that of the social scientists
in the United States. Subsequent experience
seemed to confirm the assumptions of the
American social scientists that most chronically poor farmers would have to become urban
workers in order to improve their condition.
Still, the resettlement programs of America's
social scientists could .claim only limited success
in helping the chronically poor plains farmers
make this transition, for less than 10 percent
actually profited from their programs.
If the success rate of the American policy
was not truly significant, what, then, is the
lasting importance of the social scientists who
produced it? It is that their efforts encouraged
the federal government to recognize that a
respectable level of living in modern American
agriculture was likely to be earned only by
skilled and often professionally trained farm
managers. The social scientists therefore helped
shatter one of the most politically powerful
myths in America. Their efforts made it difficult for America's government ever again to
pursue policies that are based on the belief that
anyone can move to a farm and live happily
ever after.
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